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INTRODUCTION
When human rights clash with the necessities of State security, it
becomes difficult to view torture from a dispassionate perspective.
Even known civil libertarians strengthen their opinions, and the
limits of the permissible become more flexible. Such is the case with
torture under international law, and nothing illustrates this
contradiction as clearly as Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 US.C. §§ 2340-2340A ("Standards of

Conduct Memorandum"),' a memorandum composed by the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel. Through the prism
of Sections 23402 and 2340A 3 of Title 18 of the United States Code,
the memorandum drafters seek to define and interpret what
constitutes torture. The Standards of Conduct Memorandum is a
response to a request for an opinion by the Central Intelligence

1. See Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Counsel, Office of the Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Standards of Conduct
Memorandum], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/
documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf (concluding that, in the context of
conduct of interrogation outside the United States, acts inflicting or intending to
inflict severe mental or physical pain or suffering must be "of an extreme nature"
to rise to the level of torture within the meaning of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
2. 18 U.S.C. 2340 (2000) (defining "torture," as well as the various scenarios
constituting "severe mental pain or suffering").
3. 18 U.S.C. 2340A (2000) (putting forth the punishment for acts of torture
and explaining when the United States has jurisdiction to punish such acts),
amended by United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
81 l(g) (adding that anyone conspiring to commit torture shall be subject to the
same penalties as one committing or attempting to commit torture).
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Agency on the legal norms applicable to methods of interrogation
involving suspected terrorists.4
In response to this request, the Office of Legal Counsel offered the
opinion that there are circumstances when self-defense and necessity
permit the use of force to defend another person and that if "a
government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an
interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate Section 2340A,
he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on the
United States by the Al Qaeda terrorist network." 5 The permissibility
of such conduct is based upon the advice of the Office of Legal
Counsel that the threshold of what constitutes torture is much higher
than mere cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, which are
'6
collectively referred to as "ill treatment."
In view of the ongoing war on terrorism, the occupation of Iraq,
and the continuing peacemaking presence in Afghanistan, there is
paramount value in examining the reach of the prohibition of torture
under international law. For that reason, this article will examine the
notions of what constitutes torture under international law and
whereby derogation from the prohibition on torture might be
justified.
Part I explains the applicable treaty and customary law defining
torture in international law, providing the background for Part II,
which establishes the legal reasoning used in the Standards of
Conduct Memorandum. Part III deconstructs this reasoning based on
the substance of Ireland v. United Kingdom and Public Committee
Against Torture in Israel v. Israel. Part IV examines the modem
definition of what constitutes torture, setting the stage for the
analysis in Part V of whether the prohibition of torture is absolute in
international law.

4. See Toni Locy & Thomas Frank, Gonzales 'Troubled and Offended' by
Abuse, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2005, at 2A (reporting that Gonzales later said that he
could not recall whether the CIA asked him for guidance on the interrogation
tactics). The Standards of Conduct Memorandum was sent to Gonzales by
Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee. Id.
5. Standards of Conduct Memorandum, supra note 1, at 46.
6. Id. at I (concluding that some cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment may
not constitute torture when the produced pain and suffering does not meet the
requisite intensity).
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Based on historic and recent case law, as interpreted in light of
applicable treaty law, I conclude that the threshold of what
constitutes torture under international law is much lower than what
has been submitted by the Office of Legal Counsel and that, even
under the proposed standards, ill treatment is no more permissible
under international law than torture itself.

I. THE LEGAL STATUS OF TORTURE UNDER
TREATY LAW AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
There cannot be any doubt that torture is prohibited under
international law. That much is clear from both international
humanitarian law and international human rights law perspectives.
As a notion of international humanitarian law, the customary norms
regarding torture evolved in the latter part of the nineteenth and the
early twentieth century7 and have been widely accepted, both in
opinio juris and in practice by States before being codified in the
four Geneva Conventions of 19498 and again in later additional
7. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, July
27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 343, 356, 47 Stat. 2021, 2031 ("Prisoners of war are in the
power of the hostile Power, but not of the individuals or corps who have captured
them. They must at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly
against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity."); Convention II Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 4, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 429,
436, 32 Stat. 1803, 1812 ("Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile
Government, but not in that of the individuals or corps who captured them. They
must be humanely treated."); Additional Articles Relating to the Condition of the
Wounded in War art. 11, Oct. 20, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 189, 193 ("Wounded or
sick sailors and soldiers, when embarked, to whatever nation they may belong,
shall be protected and taken care of by their captors.") (translation by author);
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 129 Consol. T.S. 361; see also Institute of International Law,
The Laws of War on Land, art. 63 (Sept. 9, 1880), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6a5d425d29d9
d6dbc 125641e0032ec97?OpenDocument ("They must be humanely treated."). The
International Institute did not attempt to propose an international treaty, but merely
offered "to the governments a 'Manual' suitable as the basis for national legislation
in each State, and in accord with both the progress of juridical science and the
needs of civilized armies." Id. preface.
8. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 [hereinafter Convention for the Wounded]; Geneva Convention for the
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protocols to the Geneva Conventions.9 At the core of this body of
law is Article 3--common to the four Geneva Conventions of
1949-which presents a core of rights that are applicable as much to
international armed conflicts as to non-international armed conflicts.
This core contains at its heart the prohibition against torture,
regardless of the status of the persons concerned, whether they are
combatants or non-combatants, including illegal combatants such as
spies and saboteurs.10 This notion is so well entrenched in the corpus

Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Convention for the Wounded at Sea]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Prisoner of War Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention to Protect Civilians].
9. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
10. Specifically, Article 3 in each convention states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 1. Persons
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life
and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by
a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Convention for the Wounded, supra note 8, 6 U.S.T. at 3116, 3118, 75 U.N.T.S. at
32, 34; Convention for the Wounded at Sea, supra note 8, 6 U.S.T. at 3220, 3222,
75 U.N.T.S. at 86, 88; Prisoner of War Convention, supra note 8, 6 U.S.T. at 3318,
3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136, 138; Convention to Protect Civilians, supra note 8, 6
U.S.T. at 3518, 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288, 290. Directly addressing "spies and
saboteurs,"the Convention to Protect Civilians states:
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juris of international law that its status is known and acknowledged
as erga omnes obligations for States, clearly defined as one owed by
a State to all members of the international community, and deemed
as having acquired the status of jus cogens.11 During international
armed conflicts, all prisoners of war, enemy aliens, spies, saboteurs,
illegal combatants, and indeed enemy combatants, are included in
2

this notion.l

However, the application of this prohibition of torture in times of
peace or periods of tension and internal tribulation, including states
of emergency, fall within the realm of international human rights
law. It is therefore necessary to define torture and its reach under
international instruments applicable to all such situations.
The document known as the "International Bill of Human
Rights" 3 contains the basic elements of the definition and scope of

Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a
spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to
the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where
absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of
communication under the present Convention. In each case, such persons
shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be
deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present
Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a
protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent
with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.
Convention to Protect Civilians, supra note 8, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3522, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 292.
11. See Robert K. Goldman, Trivializing Torture: The Office of Legal
Counsel's 2002 Opinion Letter and InternationalLaw Against Torture, 12 AM. U.
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2004) (observing that every State owes to all other countries
the obligations to prohibit torture, and this prohibition is "a peremptory norm
embodying a fundamental standard that no state can contravene").
12. See Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, The Combatant Status of the Guantanamo
Detainees, E. EUR. HUM. RTs. L.J., Sept. 2004, at 1, 10, available at
http://www.fwpublishing.net/Files/EEHRLJV1N2.pdf
(recounting the basic
principle of humanitarian law that "nobody should remain outside the law," and
noting how Article 5 of the Convention to Protect Civilians makes clear that all
civilians, regardless of participation in hostile activities to the occupying regime,
are entitled to the protections of this Convention).
13. The International Bill of Human Rights is generally understood to include
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration], International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
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the application of torture, starting with Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration").14 While the
legal force of a U.N. General Assembly resolution remains
arguable, 5 the principles enumerated in the Universal Declaration
provide the foundation of subsequent international 6 and regional 7
at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR], International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR], Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at 59, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), and the
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 128, at 206, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 15, 1989). See, e.g.,
United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet
No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm. See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Hum. Rts., Status of the InternationalCovenants
on Human Rights: Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984).
14. Universal Declaration, supra note 13, art. 5 ("No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.").
15. Summarizing the recognized status of the Universal Declaration, the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States asserts:
The binding character of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
continues to be debated ....
but the Declaration has become the accepted
general articulation of recognized rights. With some variations, the same
rights are recognized by the two principal covenants, the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

701, reporters note 6 (1987).
16. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 7 ( "No one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, at 91, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975) [hereinafter
Declaration Against Torture] (requiring States to criminalize acts of torture, as well
as "participation in, complicity in, incitement to or an attempt to commit torture");
Recommendations of the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, E.S.C. Res. 663C, at 11, ECOSOC, 24th
Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (July 31, 1957) (approving the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in
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1955, which set forth a general framework addressing prisoner conditions and
matters concerning treatment, such as clothing and bedding, food, medical
services, and freedom of religious practice), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, at 35,
ECOSOC, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (May 13, 1977); Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 169, at 186, art. 5, U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 17, 1979) ("No law
enforcement official may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may any law
enforcement official invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a
state of war or a threat of war, a threat to national security, internal -political
instability or any other public emergency as a justification of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); Principles of Medical Ethics
Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection
of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 194, at 211, Annex, U.N. GAOR,
37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (Dec. 18, 1982); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec.
10, 1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Convention on the Rights of
the Child, G.A. Res. 25, at 171, art. 37, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) ("States Parties shall ensure that: (a) No child
shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."); Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 173, at 298, U.N. GAOR, 43d
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9, 1988); Basic Principles for the
Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 111, at 200, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No.
49A, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 14, 1990); Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, at 217, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. Supp.
No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Dec. 20, 1993); Draft Optional Protocol to the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, H.R.C. Res. 33, at 151, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 58th
Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/200 (Apr. 22, 2002).
17. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official
Rec., OEA/Ser. L./V./II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82,
doc. 6, rev.1, at 18, art. 1 (1992) ("Every human being has the right to life, liberty
and the security of his person."); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, art. 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 (setting forth the right to humane treatment and
the specific treatment prohibited as a result of that right) [hereinafter American
Convention]; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9,
1985, 67 O.A.S.T.S. 13 (defining torture, discussing State responsibilities to
prevent torture, and reviewing certain circumstances, such as war, that do not
justify acts of torture); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 ("No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.")
[hereinafter European Convention]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, art. 4, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (same); Draft Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, art. 4, July 28, 2000, Charter 4422/00, Covenant 45
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instruments prohibiting torture, many retaking the original
disposition verbatim. 8 From their reading, it clearly appears that the
prohibition of torture is far-reaching, covered as much in the regional
as in the universal human rights systems.
The prohibition of torture under treaty law extends to customary
law as a norm ofjus cogens, both in matters related to international
humanitarian law and international human rights law. 19 This
peremptory legal norm is deemed fundamental enough to preclude
State contravention. °
The expansive body of prohibitive treaty law and customary
international law would seem to preclude any debate on torture and
render hopeless those arguments favoring the use of stronger
measures of interrogation. Yet, the argument is made that measures
of much vigor are not to be deemed torture. The explanation is rather
simple: while torture is universally prohibited, the definition of what
constitutes torture remains very controversial, as "each perpetrator
21
seeks to define its own behavior so as not to violate the ban."
This is explained, in part, by the entitlement given in the universal
and regional instruments applicable to the prohibition of torture, but
also to the definition of torture itself and its interpretation by
different courts and jurisdictions over time. The basis of this
(same); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 5, adopted June 27,
1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)
[hereinafter African Charter] ("All forms of exploitation and degradation of man

particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment
and treatment shall be prohibited.").
18. See

NIGEL

RODLEY,

THE

TREATMENT

OF

PRISONERS

UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (2d ed. 1999) (observing that all human rights treaties

containing provisions prohibiting torture reproduce the basic formula of Article 5
of the Universal Declaration).
19.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES §§ 102, 702 (recognizing torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment as part of customary law).
20. See, e.g., Catherine M. Grosso, Note, InternationalLaw in the Domestic
Arena: The Case of Torture in Israel, 86 IOWA L. REv. 305, 308 (2000) (using the
absence of authorization for torture in all State's domestic laws to further support
the notion that torture is universally prohibited).
21. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage
in the Use of Torture or Similar Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?, 92 KY.
L.J. 849, 856 (2003/2004) (quoting RODLEY, supra note 18, at 74).
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difference of interpretation rests in the initial adoption, in 1975, of
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ("Declaration Against Torture"), which,
under Article 1, defines torture as:
1.... [A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the
instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or
confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other
persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the
extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners.
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.22
Due to its non-binding nature, this declaration proved largely
ineffective and prompted the redaction of a convention to have an
effective mechanism by which to prohibit torture.23 When the
codification of this General Assembly declaration came to pass in the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ("Convention Against Torture"), it adopted
instead the following definition of torture:

1.... [A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain
22. Declaration Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1.
23. See generally Evelyn Mary Aswad, Note, Torture by Means of Rape, 84
GEO. L.J. 1913, 1921-22 (1996) (discussing how the Declaration Against Torture,
though ineffective, contributed to the development of the legal distinction between
torture and ill treatment).

2005]

MISINTERPRETING THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE

or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions.
2. This article is without prejudice to any international
instrument or national legislation which does or may contain
provisions of wider application.24
While the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering is a
prerequisite under both conventions, the Convention Against Torture
departs from the wording of the Declaration Against Torture in two
key areas. The intentional conduct under the Convention Against
Torture extends to "one of a broad range of illicit political purposes,"
whereas the Declaration Against Torture was limited to "one of
several illicit political purposes. '"25 Moreover, the Declaration
Against Torture required that such illicit conduct occur "by or at the
instigation of government officials," while the same element under
the Convention Against Torture is met by governmental consent or
acquiescence. 6
These revisions widened the definition of torture by applying it to
a larger scope of actions. Indeed, the notion of discrimination found
in the Convention Against Torture expanded the definition of torture
to encompass requisite acts committed for discrimination "of any
kind." Surely this expansion includes hate crimes as much as
repression through terror by the use of torture "pour encourager les
autres," a reputedly effective and much schooled method of holding
onto power by 'Presidents for Life' everywhere. 7 Furthermore, the
Convention Against Torture's inclusion of cases where consent or
acquiescence is given by persons acting in an official capacity even

24. Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1.
25. Aswad, supra note 23, at 1922-23.
26. Declaration Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1; Convention Against
Torture, supra note 16, art. 1; see also Aswad, supra note 23, at 1922-23 (arguing
that the Declaration Against Torture's non-binding nature added to its
ineffectiveness).
27. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1, where it is
expressively written that coercion in order to intimidate the victim or a third person
is prohibited, despite being the modus operandi of dictators.
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applies to undercover operatives.28 Yet, the excision of the second
paragraph--defining torture as an aggravated and deliberate form of
ill treatment-muddled the ground, permitting the argument that
since the difference is not expressly made in the Convention Against
Torture, the parameters of torture and ill treatment remain open to
interpretation. 29 This freedom is what enables proponents of a
permissive definition to claim that the threshold of conduct
constituting torture is very high indeed; methods that might be
labeled ill treatment do not necessarily amount to torture.
Interestingly, few have focused on this difference in definitions,
even though the Preamble of the Convention Against Torture refers
in its first consideration to the previous declaration, clearly intending
to make it an interpretative instrument of the convention itself, in
conjunction with Article 55 of the U.N. Charter, Article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), and
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration.30 While this interpretative
qualification of the Declaration Against Torture might appear
dangerously potent in feeding the argument that some vigorous
methods qualifying as ill treatment could in fact be deemed torture,
this fear is misplaced. Rather, the opposite should be eyed
suspiciously. Not having a precise definition of torture allows
proponents of a more forceful approach to interrogation to argue that
their tactics do not qualify as torture and therefore are not actionable
under national laws or international law.
This proposition does not fully account for the notions in the
Convention Against Torture. Proponents justify their circumvention
of international norms and national legislation by arguing that since
ill treatment is not torture, they can do it without fear of

28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
§ 702 (1987) (indicating that the prohibition against torture applies to all
those acting under the color of State law).
29. See Addicott, supra note 21, at 859 (noting that the Convention Against
Torture defines torture with clarity while exhibiting less care in defining ill
treatment).
30. Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, pmbl.; U.N. Charter art. 55;
ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 7; Universal Declaration, supra note 13, art. 5.
STATES
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prosecution.3 But under international law, their argument is based on
an incorrect interpretation of the applicable norms, as Article 16 of
the Convention Against Torture states:
1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory
under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to
torture as defined in article I, when such acts are committed
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles
10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for
references to torture of references to other forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to
the provisions of any other international instrument or
national law which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment or which relates to extradition or
expulsion.32
Under this definition, the instruction of law enforcement, military,
and public officials against ill treatment;33 the review of interrogation
methods in order to prevent ill treatment;34 the prompt and impartial
investigations of complaints of ill treatment; 35 and the right of
prisoners to complain and have their cases examined in earnest
without fear of retribution 36 are all codified to include prevention and
resolution of ill treatment as obligations of States. One may use the

31. See Grosso, supra note 20, at 309 (asserting that authorities who make a
distinction between torture and ill treatment often point to the language of the
Convention Against Torture and the Universal Declaration, which indicate that the
two practices are in fact distinct, though neither intended the distinction to ever be
used as a justification for certain practices).
32. Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 16.
33. See id. art. 10 (requiring training for any person "who may be involved in
the custody, interrogation or treatment of any person subjected to any form of
arrest").

34. See id. art. 11 (making the review requirement applicable to all
"interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices").

35. See id. art. 12 (limiting the scope to those situations in which "there is
reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed").
36. See id. art. 13 (requiring that the investigation be carried out promptly).
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wording of the Declaration Against Torture to interpret the meaning
of torture in the Convention Against Torture as an aggravated and
deliberate form of ill treatment. However, the use of ill treatment is
no more condoned under international law than torture.37 Just as a
square is also a rectangle, torture is also ill treatment. Both are illegal
and prohibited under international law.
Some might argue that under customary law, ill treatment has not
attained the status ofjus cogens and could therefore be resorted to in
some circumstances. It is true that the status of jus cogens can be
argued against for ill treatment.3 8 However, it hardly matters when
treaty law explicitly dictates applicable legal norms and outlines the
duties of States that are parties to the treaty.3 9 The Convention
Against Torture does not provide for an obligation to prosecute
perpetrators of ill treatment, but it does provide for prevention in
general, as applicable throughout the convention.40 Failing to take
adequate measures to prevent ill treatment is therefore akin to

abdicating international obligations.
Still, some States argue that since there is no obligation to
prosecute for the commission of ill treatment, it remains an
acceptable method for extracting useful information from suspects
without fear of lawsuits. This reasoning circumvents the prohibition

of torture, protects perpetrators from prosecution, and effectively

37. See, e.g., Grosso, supra note 20, at 309 ("Both [the Convention Against
Torture and the Universal Declaration] strictly forbid both torture and ill
treatment.") (emphasis added).
38. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 1 (acknowledging that while torture is
undoubtedly recognized as having attained the status of ajus cogens violation, the
status of ill treatment remains unclear).
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 331 (1987) (stating that unless a limited set of circumstances apply, a
State party is obligated to conform its behavior to the instrument to which it is a
party).
40. The Convention Against Torture's general requirements of prevention are
particularly prevalent in Articles 10-13. Convention Against Torture, supra note
16, arts. 10-13. But cf Addicott, supra note 21, at 861 (commenting that Article 16
of the Convention Against Torture does not require the criminalization of ill
treatment, nor does it require victims to be compensated, though the convention
requires both for torture).
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defeats the purpose of the Convention Against Torture4 by ceding
the moral high ground in favor of a pragmatic approach to
interrogation.42

II. THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNCIL NARROWS
THE DEFINITION OF TORTURE IN ORDER TO
EXPAND ITS USE
The Office of Legal Counsel based its interpretation of a very high
threshold for torture on the two foremost cases concerning the
matter: Ireland v. United Kingdom4 3 and Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v. Israel.' Both these cases appear on the surface to
support the contention that measures short of torture could be
acceptable in some situations and that the threshold of what
constitutes torture is so high that the security services of States party
to the Convention Against Torture can apply a wide range of
measures without having to fear breaching their international
obligations. A closer examination of the facts and contextual basis
surrounding these cases makes the contentions argued by the Office
of Legal Counsel highly questionable.

41. The rationale holds about as much weight as one who exclaims that "we
had to bum the village in order to save it," or that "in order to defeat your enemy,
you must become like him."
42. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 11, at 3-4 (commenting that the U.S.
justification for harsher treatment during interrogation as a means of preventing
future damage to the United States by terrorists is self-defeating when considering
the likely ramifications of future treatment of captured U.S. soldiers).
43. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1978).
44. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999], available
at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html (search "Parties" for
"Public Committee Against Torture in Israel," then click on case name). This case
is the consolidation of numerous lawsuits, demanding that Israel to stop using
questionable methods of interrogations. These cases are: HCJ 4054/95 Ass'n for
Civil Rights in Isr. v. Prime Minister of Israel [1999]; HCJ 6536/95 Abu Zaiyda v.
General Security Services [1999]; HCJ 5188/96 Al Kaaqua v. General Security
Services [1999]; HCJ 7563/97 Ghaneimat Ganimat v. Minister of Defense [1999];
HCJ 7628/97 Qur'an v. Minister of Defense [ 1999]; HCJ 1043/99 Batat v. General
Security Services [1999]. Id.
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A. IRELAND V. UNITED KINGDOM
Ireland v. United Kingdom supports the contention that torture is
not the same as inhuman or degrading treatment, which is ill
treatment as understood under the Convention Against Torture. By a
vote of thirteen to four, the court decided that the practices known as
"the five techniques," 4 5-the heart of the applicants' claim for breach
of Article 3 of Europe's Convention for the Protections of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention") 6-"did
not constitute . . . torture [as understood under the treaty]."'"
However, it also found by a vote of sixteen to one that the techniques
under discussion were "inhuman and degrading treatment."48 On
these findings, the court found unanimously that it "cannot direct the
respondent State to institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings
against those members of the security forces who have committed
the breaches of Article 3 found by the Court and against those who
condoned or tolerated such breaches. 49
It is important to note that the European Commission's
investigation did not find that the five techniques had caused -any
physical injuries, although weight loss and acute psychiatric
symptoms stemming from the interrogation were recorded as medical
evidence and included in post-interrogation findings.5 0 Claims of

45. The five techniques consist of:
(a) wall standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some hours in
a 'stress position' ... ; (b) hooding: putting a black or navy coloured bag over
the detainees' heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except
during interrogation; (c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations,
holding the detainees in a room where there was a continuous loud and
hissing noise; (d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving
the detainees of sleep; (e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the
detainees to a reduced diet during their stay at the centre and pending
interrogations.
Ireland,25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41.
46. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
47. Ireland,25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 94.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 95.
50. Id. at 44 (noting that while the Commission was convinced of psychiatric
aftereffects from the interrogation, the precise degree of the effects was uncertain).
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beatings were therefore rejected because they were not
substantiated."
One could hastily conclude that the court, in its decision, agreed
that the combination of the "five techniques" is what made the
conduct "inhuman and degrading," while the use of a particular
technique does not, by itself, reach the level of prohibited
treatment.52 One could just as hastily reason from the absence of
bodily injuries that inflicted physical pain failing to leave permanent
marks or impair organs would not constitute torture. 53 A final
inference from the decision is that the definition of torture has an
extremely high threshold. 4 From these inferences, the conclusion
reached is that since the court examined a case of "severe" and/or
"substantial" beatings not deemed torture under the "severity and
intensity" test, isolated incidents of physical beatings do not
constitute torture.55 This is certainly what the Office of Legal
Counsel infers from the court's decision.
All these conclusions are erroneous, anachronistic, and
misleading. They are erroneous because they selectively draw on a
very limited number of quotes from the case at hand. They are
anachronistic because they rely on a case pre-dating the entrance into
force of the Convention Against Torture and instead apply the
definition used in the Declaration Against Torture. The conclusions
are misleading because they rest upon a non-applicable definition of
international law that has been supplanted by another through the
most restrictive case available, distorting the state of international
legal norms at this time.

51. Id.
52. See Standards of Conduct Memorandum, supra note 1, at 29 ("The
European Court of Human Rights concluded that these techniques used in
combination, and applied for hours at a time, were inhuman and degrading but did
not amount to torture.").
53. See id. at 1 ("Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death.").
54. See id. at 29 (noting that intense physical and mental suffering may only
rise to the level of inhuman treatment and emphasizing how torture requires
sufficient intensity of the administered cruel and inhuman treatment).
55. Id.
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The Office of Legal Counsel also fails to mention that on February
8, 1977, the same day the case was heard, the Attorney General of
the United Kingdom declared that Her Majesty's Government would
not under any circumstances reintroduce the "five techniques" as an
aid to interrogation,56 clearly repudiating the legality of these
practices, regardless of whether they are used individually or in some
combination.
The Office of Legal Counsel dismisses "massive," "substantial,"
and "severe" beatings as falling short of torture because the court in
Ireland v. United Kingdom did not recognize them as such. However,
the court's decision was based on the simple definition of the
European Convention, which states solely that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."57 The court interpreted this definition with reference to
the Declaration Against Torture's definition, which is far different
from the contemporary and applicable definition contained in the
Convention Against Torture. 8
The definition is certainly different from the wide-reaching
elements examined above, in particular as to the enlargement of the
notion that severe physical or psychological pain and suffering be
inflicted intentionally for a broad range of political purposes.5 9 In the
case of Irelandv. United Kingdom, the political conflict between the
Loyalists and the Republicans had been known for decades and the
support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary to the "moderate" Loyalists

56. See Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 43 ("'The Government of the
United Kingdom have considered the question of the use of the 'five techniques'
with very great care and with particular regard to Article 3 of the Convention. They
now give this unqualified undertaking, that the 'five techniques' will not in any
circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation."'). But cf Brandie
Gasper, Examining the Use of Evidence Obtained Under Torture: The Case of the
British Detainees May Test the Resolve of the European Convention in the Era of
Terrorism, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2005) (analyzing British
complicity in using evidence obtained through third parties where the means used
to obtain the evidence may have included torturous acts).
57. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
58. See discussion supra Part I (contrasting the two definitions of torture).
59. See supra notes 20-26 and surrounding text.
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had never been hidden from the public. 60 Then again, the court's
reasoning that the acts attributed to the security forces were not
torture, but inhuman and degrading treatment, did not refer to the
beatings, but to the "five techniques" under discussion in the case.6 '
The Office of Legal Counsel, therefore, misattributes the reasoning
of the court to an unrelated conclusory statement.
Moreover, the Office of Legal Counsel once more shows its
selective reading by omitting the fact that these "massive,"
"substantial," and "severe" beatings were the object of denials by
fourteen members of the security forces accused of witnessing or
perpetrating them (if not believed by the Commission) and that the
Commission believed that certain assertions of the claimants were
"exaggerated, invented or improbable. ' 62 The conclusion from this is
that the beatings might have occurred or not, but that if they did, they
certainly were not of the intensity alleged by the claimants.
One of the claimants in the case did sustain an injury-a
perforated eardrum-during his detention, which supports the
contention that the court views some physical maltreatment as failing
to achieve the status of torture. This contention is based on the
distinction drawn by the European Convention between torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment, based on a
distinction between cruelty and intensity thereof.63
Of all the injuries detailed in the case, only the aforementioned ear
injury concerns an impaired body organ, yet the court concluded that
this did not amount to torture. On this point, the Office of Legal
Counsel would certainly seem to have made its case, if one did not
take into account that since the Convention Against Torture, the

60. See generally Claire Palley, The Evolution, Disintegration and Possible
Reconstruction of the Northern Ireland Constitution, 1 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 368
(1972) (providing a discussion of the historical and political background relevant
to Ireland v. United Kingdom).
61. Ireland,25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 94.
62. Id. at 46.
63. Id. at 68.
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applicable definition has been expanded and case law has also
evolved the legal definition of torture. 4
B. PUBLIC COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL V. ISRAEL
Foreseeing the argument of an expanded definition of torture since
Ireland, the Standards of Conduct Memorandum attempts to base-its
finding on the more recent case of Public Committee Against Torture
in Israel v. Israel.65 Based on the five methods presented in that
case, 66 the Office of Legal Counsel notes that "while the Israeli
Supreme Court concluded that these acts amounted to cruel and
inhuman treatment, the court did not expressly find that they
amounted to torture. 67

64. See discussion infra Part IV (tracking the evolution of the definition of
torture and applicable case law); see also Campbell v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1982) (defining torture separately from inhuman
treatment).
65. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999], available
at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html (search "Parties" for
"Public Committee Against Torture in Israel," then click on case name).
66. Id. 7 10-13 (describing the Israeli police's methods for interrogating
suspects).
[A] suspect investigated under the "Shabach" position has his hands tied
behind his back. He is seated on a small and low chair, whose seat is tilted
forward, towards the ground. One hand is tied behind the suspect, and placed
inside the gap between the chair's seat and back support. His second hand is
tied behind the chair, against its back support. The suspect's head is covered
by a sack that falls down to his shoulders. Loud music is played in the room.
According to briefs submitted, suspects are detained in this position for a long
period of time, awaiting interrogation.
Id. 10. "[The 'Frog Crouch'] refers to consecutive, periodical crouches on the
tips of one's toes lasting for five minute intervals." Id. 11. Several petitioners
"contended that [the practice of excessively tight handcuffs] results in serious
injury to the suspect's hands, arms and feet, due to the length of the
interrogations." Id. 12.
Petitioners [also] complained of being deprived of sleep as a result of being
tied in the "Shabach" position, while subject to the playing of loud music, or
being subject to intense, non-stop interrogations without sufficient rest breaks.
They claim that the purpose of depriving them of sleep is to cause them to
break from exhaustion.
Id. 13.
67. Standards of Conduct Memorandum, supra note 1, at 30.
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There is merit to the Office of Legal Counsel's assertion, but it is
only part of a larger story that requires reading the case in its
entirety. In fact, the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High
Court of Justice, failed to actually find that these acts amounted to
cruel and inhuman treatment. Only once did the court refer to the
findings of -the European Court of Justice in Ireland v. United
Kingdom,6" when it referred to the use of a "similar-though not
identical method" as "inhuman and degrading treatment. ' 69 However,
nowhere did it define the techniques used by the General Security
Services ("GSS") of Israel as either torture or inhuman and
degrading treatment, because it dealt solely and restrictively with the
question of whether the Government of Israel or the Head of the GSS
had the authority "to establish directives regarding the use of
physical means during the interrogation of suspects suspected of
hostile terrorist activities, beyond the general rules which can be
inferred from the very concept of an interrogation itself."7
Moreover, the Office of Legal Counsel fails to mention that the GSS
had declared that the use of physical violence and the method known
as the "Shabach" had either been stopped or was not used during
interrogation for the investigations under discussion prior to the case
being heard.71 GSS officials did not, however, declare that these
methods would not be used again, unlike the officials in the case of
Ireland v. UnitedKingdom.
As such, the court did not even address the question of whether the
methods used were torture or not. Had it done so, the Supreme Court
of Israel would not have had to consider the European Convention,
but rather the Convention Against Torture.7 2 The Court certainly
68. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3.
69. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr.,

30 (recognizing the similarities

between the English tactics and those of the GSS in order to reinforce the necessity
of prohibiting such methods despite any failure of them to qualify as torture).
70. Id. 38.
71. See id. 6-7 (noting that the Court issued an order nisi in both situations
to hear the complaints of each detainee, but finding that the offensive procedures
had stopped prior to the hearing).
72. Compare European Convention, supra note 17, art. 3 ("No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." ), with
Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1 (providing a more specific
definition of prohibited conduct).
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would have considered the notions and methods used by the
European Court of Human Rights. However, its examination would
not have been limited to Ireland v. United Kingdom due to the
proliferation of case law addressing the topic of torture versus ill
treatment in the more than twenty-year time span between that
decision and Public Committee Against Torture in Israel.
The court would most probably have referred to the case law and
advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
which has actively defined and refined its approach to the issue of
torture. The difference, of course, is that the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights is based upon the American Convention on Human
Rights, and this treaty contains both a negative and positive edict in
Article 5.73 The first sentence of Article 5(2) establishes the negative
right by declaring that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment,"74 while the
second sentence of the same section states that "persons deprived of
their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person," setting forth the positive right.75

III. 1978-1996: JUDICIAL RETICENCE AND THE
"SPECIAL STIGMA" OF TORTURE LIMITS
DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW POST-IRELAND
The effect of the Ireland v. United Kingdom decision has certainly
proved enduring, as the European Court of Human Rights did not
find any acts of torture in cases decided between 1978 and 1996.
Although it has decided cases on inhuman or degrading treatmentmostly relating to degrading treatment-no determination of an act
of torture took place during that time under the guidance of the
Council of Europe's own European Convention at Article 3, despite
the fact that the court considered many claims from numerous
countries. Samples of these cases demonstrate that the court was
most unwilling to attach what it calls the "special stigma to
deliberate inhuman treatments causing very serious and cruel

73. American Convention, supra note 17, art. 5.
74. Id. art. 5(2).

75. Id.
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suffering. 76 However, this reticence on the part of the court existed
prior to the case of Ireland, as the European Commission of Human
Rights has always limited access to the court to those claims which
had exhausted all recourses under the national legislation." During
that time, the court concentrated on the legacy of Ireland in
conjunction with offenses relating to corporal punishment in schools,
detention, or police actions.78
In the matter of corporal punishment, it was never alleged that the
punishments imposed amounted to torture. The only questions at
hand were whether caning the buttocks with three strokes, 79 hitting
the hands with a leather strap called a "tawse, ' 80 hitting the buttocks
through gym shorts with a rubber-soled gym shoe, 81 and caning the
buttocks four times through the trousers,82 fell within the purview of
"degrading" treatments. In the first three cases, the court concluded
that corporal punishment in school was an assault on the dignity and
physical integrity of an individual, especially considering the young
age of the students who were subjected to the disciplinary measures,

76. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66-67 (1978)
(articulating that the distinction between "torture" and "inhuman or degrading
treatment" relates to the differences in the intensity of the suffering inflicted upon
the person).
77. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 26 ("The Commission may
only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted,
according to the generally recognized rules of international law, and within a
period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.") This
restrictive approach remains sensible due to the presumably high volume of cases
that would be directed at the court if this restriction were liberalized.
78. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text (providing a review of cases
addressing such offenses during this time).
79. See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1978) ("The
birching raised, but not cut, the applicant's skin and he was sore for about a week
and a half afterward.").
80. See Campbell v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1982)
(noting that while corporal punishment does not itself amount to torture,
threatening a person with torture might in some cases amount to "inhuman
treatment").
81. See Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 50, 52
(1993).
82. See Y. v. United Kingdom, 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5, 7 (1992).
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but that the force used had been moderate and that the feelings of
humiliation were not enough to constitute degrading treatment.83
However, the court disagreed in Y. v. United Kingdom,8 4 where the
family doctor examined the pupil disciplined on the day of the
punishment and reported that the *pupil had ."four wheals across both
buttocks, each wheal approximately [fifteen centimeters] in length
and swelling of both buttocks. 85 Since both the police and the lower
courts refused to pursue the matter, the European Commission
investigated and referred the case to the European court, which found
that the "significant physical injury and humiliation" amounted to
degrading treatment or punishment in contravention of Article 3 of
the European Convention.86
In terms of detention, the debate centered on the conditions of
detention and on the issue of solitary confinement. This method,
widely used as a preventive tool and a punishment in European
prisons, was not long in coming before the court. In a case involving
a solitary confinement of seventeen months, the court found that the
confinement did not qualify as inhuman treatment because the
detainees could listen to the radio, watch television, exercise one
hour per day, obtain books from the prison library, have personal
contact with the guards and access to controlled family visits. 8 Also,

it is important to note that the detainees had access to legal counsel

83. See, e.g., Campbell, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) at 13 (explaining that it would

be a distortion of the ordinary use of the term to find that corporal punishment
could constitute "degrading" conduct).
84. 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser, A) at 5.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 14. Originally, complaints were both in the name of the mother and of
Y., but the Commission deemed the complaint of the mother inadmissible while
that of Y. was referred to the court. Id. at 8. The case was never decided upon as
the Government of the United Kingdom reached an out of court settlement with the
plaintiff, without admission of wrongdoing, and therefore the case was "struck out
of the list." Id. at 9.
87. See R. v. Denmark, App. No. 10263/83, 41 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
149, 152-54 (1985) (finding that even when a period of solitary confinement was
for an "undesirable amount of time," it could still be permissible under Article 3 if
the conditions of the confinement did not rise to the level of severity creating an
Article 3 violation).
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and to medical care at all times on request.88 Availability of, and
access to, medical care has been established as a central factor in
determining whether detainees have suffered ill treatment.89
Of all the factors considered, only incidents involving police
action seem to have raised a real question of torture in Europe from
1978 to 1996, though none were judged to have attained this
aggravated and deliberate form of inhuman treatment. Ever reticent
to accuse a high contracting party of torture in a manner that would
profit a political opponent, the Commission did not designate as
torture cases where physical violence had been alleged. 90 In the rare
instances when it did find that physical violence had escalated to
such an extent that it violated Article 3 of the European Convention,
the court failed to specifically characterize the action as torture.
Such was the approach of the court in Tomasi v. France,91 a case
that involved a French national of Corsica who was interrogated with
physical violence at a French police station. The court stated that
while the injuries of Mr. Tomasi were slight, the examination of the
medical document provided to the court offered enough proof to
determine that a violation of Article 3 had occurred.92 Similar
determinations of violations on prima facie evidence of degrading
treatment had also been rendered in cases of police arrests and
detentions. 93

88. See id. at 153-54.
89. See, e.g., R., S., A. & C. v. Portugal, App. Nos. 9911/82, 9945/82 (joined),
36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 200, 205, 207-08 (1984) (reviewing the
circumstances surrounding the maltreatment of prisoners who went on a hunger
strike, and evaluating the government's response to the prisoners' actions).
90. See Donnelly v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5577-5583/72, 4 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 4 (1975).
91. 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 (1992).
92. Id. at 42 (articulating that even though the prisoner's injuries were slight,
the blows caused feelings of fear, anguish, and inferiority amounting to inhuman
and degrading treatment).
93. See, e.g., Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6 (1995); Raninen
v. Finland, 1997-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2804.
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IV. RECONSIDERATION AND EXPANSION OF THE
DEFINITION OF TORTURE
The breakthrough on the question of what constitutes torture
finally came in Aksoy v. Turkey.94 In that case, the Commission
determined that the accused had been tortured, and the court itself
upheld this assessment. 95 The applicant claimed that he had been ill
treated in many different ways,96 and that as a result of the
"Palestinian hanging," 97 he suffered subsequent paralysis of both
arms for a period of about two weeks. 9 The court did not mince
words in stating that the treatment qualified as torture. 99 It further
specified that this decision was based on the distinction between
torture and ill treatment, where the former requires the presence of
deliberateness and aggravation. 00
A subsequent determination of torture was made in Aydin v.
Turkey,1"' where the court determined that rape by an official of the
94. 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260.
95. Id. at 2277-78 (explaining that when an individual enters police custody in
good health, but leaves with injuries, the detaining government has the burden of
providing a plausible explanation showing that there has been no violation of
Article 3 of the European Convention).
96. Id. at 2278 (recounting abuse that included Palestinian hangings, electric
shocks, beatings, slapping and verbal abuse).
97. Id. (explaining that a "Palestinian hanging" involved being suspended from
his arms, which were bound together behind his back).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2279 ("The Court considers that this treatment was of such a serious
and cruel nature that it can only be described as torture. In view of the gravity of
this conclusion, it is not necessary for the Court to examine the applicant's
complaints of other forms of ill treatment.").
100. Id. at 2278-79.
101. 1997-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866, 1873-74, 1891 (describing the applicant as a
seventeen-year-old girl who was arrested and driven away from her village and
brought to the gendarmerie headquarters ten kilometers away where she then "was
raped by a person whose identity has still to be determined").
[She] was also subjected to a series of particularly terrifying and humiliating
experiences while in custody at the hands of the security forces at Derik
gendarmerie headquarters having regard to her sex and youth and the
circumstances under which she was held. She was detained over a period of
three days during which she must have been bewildered and disoriented by
being kept blindfolded, and in a constant state of physical pain and mental
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State was in itself grave and abhorrent, and that rape left deep
psychological scars on the victim.' The court went so far as to
announce that it would have reached the same conclusion on either
physical or psychological grounds of the applicant's claim. 0 3 These
two cases represent an important departure from Ireland, which was
further reinforced by yet another decision-the case of Selmouni v.
04
France.1

Relying on the precedent set in Aksoy and Aydin, the court in
Selmouni again determined that the alleged ill treatment under
examination in the case was indeed proven and that it amounted to
torture. 0 51 Here, the facts of the case involved blows to the body,
sexual humiliation, and threats of bodily harm with a blowtorch and
a syringe. 0 6 The court did not limit itself to characterizing the
alleged acts as torture. Instead, it took the additional step of declaring
that the severity test articulated in Ireland was to be interpreted
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture,
and not solely on the basis of the European Convention."'

anguish brought on by the beatings administered to her during questioning
and by the apprehension of what would happen to her next. She was also
paraded naked in humiliating circumstances thus adding to her overall sense
of vulnerability and on one occasion she was pummeled with high-pressure
water while being spun around in a tyre.
Id. at 1891.
102. Id. (highlighting how an individual's position as a State officials increases
the ease of exploiting victims and explaining that the psychological effects of such
victimization are particularly damaging and long-lived). The victim "also
experienced the acute physical pain of forced penetration, which must have left her
feeling debased and violated both physically and emotionally." Id.
103. Id. at 1892.
104. App. No. 25803/94, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 155.
105. Id. at 184.
106. Id. at 183 (explaining that the examining doctor found that "marks of
violence . . . covered almost all of [Mr. Selmouni's] body"). Furthermore, Mr.

Selmouni was "dragged by his hair," tripped repeatedly by officers as he ran down
a corridor, and an officer urinated on him. Id.
107. Id. at 182 ("[I]t remains to be established in the instant case whether the
'pain or suffering' inflicted on Mr. Selmouni can be defined as 'severe' within the
meaning of Article 1 of the United Nations Convention. The Court considers that
this 'severity' is, like the 'minimum severity' required for the application of
Article 3, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the
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The court further stated that the European Convention was a
"living instrument," and that certain acts classified previously as
inhuman or degrading could be classified differently in the future. In
effect, the court said that the Ireland severity test must be adapted to
08
reflect contemporary understanding and evolution of the law. 1
This judgment of the European Court of Human Rights certainly
flies in the face of the argument presented by the Office of Legal
Counsel, which relies solely on a quarter-century-old opinion
favorable to its argument, but fails to mention the evolution of the
law in the last decade. While it cannot be said that the evolution of
torture as a defined standard prohibits the argument of the Office of
Legal Counsel under U.S. law, neither can it be said that the status of
torture has remained static in international law since Ireland.
Today's threshold of what constitutes torture is certainly much lower
than the parameters suggested in the Standards of Conduct
Memorandum. This evolving threshold continues to be interpreted on
the merits and circumstances of each and every case. 109 As a result,
interpretations of whether actions and conduct constitute torture must
adapt to the times. The ceiling of tolerated actions has been lowered
substantially since the first determination of Ireland.

V. TORTURE IS NOT THE ANSWER: ARGUMENTS
AGAINST JUSTIFIED DEROGATION
This review of the determination of torture invariably leads to a
fundamental question: Are there any occasions when the prohibition
of torture is not absolute? Are there any occasions when one should
deem an emergency so important, or a situation so dire, that usual
decency and values must be pitted against the inner beast, forcing
one to adopt measures that he or she usually would find repulsive
and abhorrent to use? The answer is no, none whatsoever.

case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in
some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.").
108. Id. at 183 (citing Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1516 (1978); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1989);
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26-27 (1995)).
109. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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A. NECESSITY DOES NOT OUTWEIGH
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS

Some propose that derogations might be possible when a nation is
under imminent threat, and self-defense could be invoked to justify
acts of physical and psychological violence to obtain information and
therefore save lives. This is, in essence, the proposition brought forth
by the GSS of Israel in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel,
and it was adopted by the Office of Legal Counsel in its Standards of
Conduct Memorandum. This theory must fail. While the rights
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration may be considered nonbinding, parties may not derogate from those contained in Article 7
of the ICCPR regarding torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, ensuring that even in case of tensions, troubles,
emergencies, or war, there can be no use of torture."' The
restrictions contained in the regional instruments, with the exception
of the African Convention, are just as stringent."' Even if these
regional instruments were not equally stringent, the Convention
Against Torture reinforces the absoluteness of the prohibition in all
circumstances, expressly stipulating that "[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture.""' 2 In other words, there is no
situation that justifies torture.

110. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 4(2) ("No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8

(paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.").
111. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 17, art. 30 ("The restrictions

that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or exercise of
the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in accordance
with laws enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the
purpose for which such restrictions have been established."); European
Convention, supra note 17, art. 15. ("(1) In time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent
with its other obligations under intemational law. (2) No derogation from Article 2,
except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4
(paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.").
112. Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 2(2).
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As a result, there cannot be any doubt that the prohibition of
torture is absolutely applicable in times of both war and peace, as
well as during national emergencies. This, however, may not
necessarily mean that measures of physical or psychological violence
short of torture are not acceptable during such periods. Much has
been made of the citation by the Supreme Court of Israel to Dr.
Dershowitz's proposal that certain measures, such as the use of a
syringe to break the skin under the fingernails, might inflict pain but
13
still fall short of torture.'
What has been overlooked is the fact that the court, while
grudgingly granting the possibility of a necessity defense in "ticking
bombs" situations-instances where specific information could save
lives-this defense would have to be proven after the fact if a
security official were to be indicted. The court reminds the parties
that the issue in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel is
whether the Government of Israel or the Head of the GSS of Israel
had the authority to determine guidelines for such situations, a
question it answered in the negative. 1 4 Furthermore, the court
specifies that the necessity defense may prevent one from escaping
prosecution and liability, but does not add any other normative value.
In plain terms, it is not because the agent committing ill treatment or
torture escapes prosecution that the acts committed do not infringe
on human rights. Therefore, the necessity defense does not permit
anyone to justify torture in international law.115
B. LACK OF IMMINENT THREAT PRECLUDES
SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Much in the same manner, proponents of the possibility of
derogating from the prohibition of torture have argued that selfdefense could permit such derogations. This corrupts the notions of
self-defense as understood in international law, which can only occur
after an attack or, in the case of anticipatory self-defense, in a set of
113. See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999], 34,
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html
(search
"Parties" for "Public Committee Against Torture in Israel," then click on case
name) (assuming a necessity defense might allow such measures).
114. Id. 36.
115. Id.
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circumstances that has yet to be demonstrated as existing within a
legal norm applicable and recognized in international law. "16 The
notion of self-defense does not permit one to take actions unless an
attack has occurred, or is so imminent that it cannot be denied, and
alternative methods are not available. This is not the case during an
interrogation, where many methods are available and time is
available to extract the information. Contrary to the necessity
defense, self-defense would create a normative value prior to the
fact, since it is the basis for justifying the actions to be committed.
However, no case has yet reported on the permissible conditions for
anticipatory self-defense in line with its stringent requirements.
C. THE MORAL PRICE OF TORTURE IS Too HIGH FOR
MODERN SOCIETY TO PAY
Some proponents of justified torture, especially those willing to
pursue policies that conflict with international law, will point out that
the Standards of Conduct Memorandum has been superseded by a
new memorandum published in 2004, entitled Re: Legal Standards
Applicable Under 18 U.S. C. §§ 2340-2340A ("Standards of Conduct
Memorandum II").I17 The clear objective of Standards of Conduct
Memorandum II is to appease the popular uproar created by the first
memorandum. This goal was attained, in part, by diminishing the
extreme statements one can find in the Standards of Conduct
Memorandum.
However, the new memorandum still reverts to the argument that
torture is an act of greater gravity than ill treatment. It simply restates
the point that torture is an aggravated form of ill treatment and
reiterates the very high threshold for acts to qualify as torture. While
very effective in removing the debate from the public eye, Standards
of Conduct Memorandum II does not address the changed

116. See Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory SelfDefense in ContemporaryInternationalLaw, in HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
129, 129-47 (Peter Kovacs ed., 2004), reprinted in 1 MISKOLC J. INT'L L. 104-20
(2004), available at http://www.uni-miskolc.hu/-wwwdrint/20042rouillard.htm.
117. Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel,

Office of the Assistant Attorney General, for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney
General, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30,

2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/dojtorture123
004mem.pdf.
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conceptualization of the threshold of torture and, worse, fails to
mention that ill treatment and torture are both prohibited under
international law.
Those who support the use of torture-or even the use of physical
or psychological pressure that falls just short of torture-in order to
guarantee the security of the State, reason that persons who aim to
destroy civil society and democratic values do so because their sense
of value is warped and they lack respect for others' human rights.
They presume that the perpetrators' "evilness" is purely
circumstantial and is so ingrained as to be incurable. As a result,
proponents of torture argue, these persons abdicate the respect owed
to their own human rights. But this argument fails to consider that
each action denying the humanity of the other denies, in fact, one's
own entitlement to human rights. Their logic would thus unravel the
very civil society they purport to protect and undermine the very
democratic values they swear to uphold.
The very source of this misguided argument-the Supreme Court
of Israel-understands that it is only by applying our ideals that we
preserve them, and that double standards destroy the very things we
most want to preserve. We need only refer to the closing words in
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel to learn how the court
that is most experienced in confronting terrorism views the delicate
balance between security and liberty:
This is the destiny of a democracy-it does not see all means
as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always
open before it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one
hand tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the
upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an individual
constitute important components in its understanding of
security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and
this strength allows it to overcome its difficulties. 18

CONCLUSION
The prohibition against torture has been made absolute in
universal and regional instruments. It is further prohibited in all
circumstances by both treaty law and customary law. Because it has

118. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr., HCJ 5100/94,

40.
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acquired the status ofjus cogens, the only way to circumvent or deny
this legal norm is to claim that the physical or psychological
treatment fails to meet the severity test outlined in Ireland v. United
Kingdom. However, as Aksoy v. Turkey, Aydin v. Turkey, and
Selmouni v. France have demonstrated, the interpretation of what
amounts to torture must be made in accordance with the times, and
the courts in our contemporary era have lowered the threshold from
what would have been considered "ill treatment" twenty-five years
ago to qualify as "torture" today. The selective reading of treaties
and case law by the Office of Legal Counsel will not change these
facts.

